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Abstract South–South relations have regained widespread interest in recent years, 
together with increasingly visible stances on international stages. Brazil’s interac-
tions with the African continent, in particular, came to epitomise such a percep-
tion while sustaining an expectation of mutual alignment in several global issues. 
However, these assumptions still lack empirical corroboration. Drawing on United 
Nations General Assembly voting data for the 1991–2013 timeframe, this article 
questions a supposed South–South solidarity at the multilateral institution with the 
largest global representation and identifies key thematic axes that incite greater col-
lective stances. The analysis further sheds light on whether or not a common South–
South agenda has emerged over time.
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Introduction
The notion that South–South relations have regained new levels of depth, thus result-
ing in increasingly visible stances in international stages, has won considerable sup-
port in recent years. That, in turn, has been translated into new streams of research 
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that have highlighted venues and topics which substantiate this newfound resurgence 
(e.g. Braveboy-Wagner 2009; Alden et al. 2010). Overall, these dynamics can be con-
sidered a product of two intertwined developments. On the one hand, the noticeable 
visibility of rising powers from the South, which has led to a subsequent increase in 
the discourse over common institutionalised positions on a plethora of international 
issues. On the other hand, the slow decline of the post-Cold War institutional status 
quo, which has, concomitantly, produced the necessary conditions for an expanded 
debate that seeks to include dissenting voices in multiple international arenas.
Increased research notwithstanding, it should be noted that wider South–South 
relations remain since its early days, characterised by diversity, volatility and poros-
ity in their composition, leading to frequent reformulations in alliances and sub-South 
regional groupings—often due to changes in the political leadership of the main lead-
ing countries—in a constant attempt to acquire the greatest possible representation and 
associated followership. Currently, the ‘Global South’ can be considered the most neu-
tral definition that encapsulates the ‘rough geographical status as well as a general sense 
of common global problems and aims’ (Braveboy-Wagner 2009: 3). More so when con-
sidering how ‘the widespread use of inverted commons’, ranging from the ‘West’, to the 
‘developing world’, or to the ‘Rest’, has hindered more consensual analytical categori-
sations (Hurrell 2013: 215). Meanwhile, other concepts such as South–South Coopera-
tion (SSC) remain strongly embedded in the political-economic dictates of development 
assistance (e.g. Renzio and Seifert 2014). In every one of these cases, the high-politics 
component is easily overshadowed as are the intricacies of bilateral contacts and diplo-
matic practices that allow for cooperation to occur in the first place.
Acknowledging these shortcomings, we opt to follow a broader conceptualisation 
of South–South relations, in order to better underline the political dimension that we 
aim to explore here. We are particularly interested in displaying how such dynamics 
manage to entail or not new diplomatic coalitional realities in world stages (e.g. Roth-
stein 1977). South–South relations can then be understood as being deeply rooted in 
a strong sense of common solidarity over global governance, economic and develop-
ment issues, which provides sufficient basis for the transposition of preliminary dis-
cussions into coalitional fronts in international arenas. In other words, we deem them 
as a mobilising symbol (Alden et al. 2010), manifested through different collective 
platforms, often against Northern-led conceptualisations of the international order.
South–South relations, however, also constitute a set of extremely fluid interac-
tions, usually dependent on the context at the time of any intended focus. This poses 
considerable obstacles not only for longitudinal analyses of their inner cohesiveness 
but also in terms of singling out possible case studies as proper representations of 
such kind of ties. In our view, Brazilian–African relations may just prove a compro-
mise solution, as a test tube of the intensity behind current South–South relations 
still in need of factual evaluation. Indeed, after President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 
took office in 2003, South–South relations were formally elevated to new levels of 
priority. By ‘pursuing a psychologically transformative foreign policy agenda in the 
Global South’ (Burges 2005: 1134), Brazil broke with previous conceptualisations 
and pushed for new political, economic and development relations with alternative 
partners, including African countries. The latter, for their part, recognised the poten-
tial bargaining outcomes in dealing with rising powers and began to privilege more 
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‘coordinated, collective and coherent engagements’ in the external domain (Vickers 
2013: 670). Such interactions thus came to epitomise a generalised perception of 
resurging Southern-led dynamics. One way of promoting and sustaining concerted 
action and consultations was precisely through the United Nations General Assem-
bly (UNGA), once deemed by Lula da Silva, a ‘great forum for general debate con-
cerning humankind’s major problems’ (Corrêa 2013: 933).
Yet, this state of affairs raises some queries. How far up have perceptions of 
an expected mutual alignment in the discussion and resolution of several global 
issues materialised? How cohesive have Brazil and African countries behaved at 
the UNGA? And how have such relations accompanied the increased relevance 
attributed to South–South relations in the last few years? By unpacking the gist of 
South–South relations in the present day, two core goals drive this article: (1) to 
quantitatively verify a supposed South–South solidarity at the multilateral institution 
with the largest global representation; and (2) to identify key thematic axes that may 
or may not incite greater collective stances at the UNGA.
With that in mind, we rely on quantitative data from UNGA voting records 
between 1991 and 2013 to try and provide a descriptive inference of levels of cohe-
siveness as well as variations over time and content. We subscribe to the interpreta-
tion that such data comprises a valid ‘indicator of its foreign policy orientation and 
international alignments’, as well as a ‘record of how the state wants to be seen by 
others, the international norms it finds acceptable, and the positions it is willing to 
take publicly’ (Mattes et  al. 2015: 284). More importantly, we focus on possible 
informal cross-regional groupings at the UNGA, which still remain largely unex-
plored (Laatikainen 2017). Our option concerning the time period is substantiated 
by both the need to provide a critical juncture point with significant impact for both 
Brazil and the African continent—such as the end of the Cold War—and by data 
restrictions over more recent years. Regardless, the relevance of this research stands 
out on two separate accounts. On the one hand, the only study of the kind centred 
on South–South relations within the UNGA dates back to 1988 and exclusively con-
cerns the Group of 77 (G77) (Iida 1988), thus leaving the field lacking a fresh take 
on the subject. On the other hand, recent studies have either focused on the cohesion 
of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) (Ferdinand 2014; Hooi-
jmaaijers and Keukeleire 2016), on how such countries perceive their surrounding 
regions as stepping stones to global projection (Montenegro and Mesquita 2017), 
or on Brazil–US relations, as a way to historically explain the evolution of the for-
mer’s foreign policy trajectory (Amorim Neto 2012). No attention has been paid to 
alternative high-politics formations, such as those heralded by Brazil and Africa in 
the background of the latest Global South élan. Even less effort has been placed on 
deconstructing such dynamics as a single unit of analysis. We believe these inter-
twined gaps further bolster the pertinence of our original standpoint.
The article abides by the ensuing structure. We begin by unpacking the chief 
expressions of South–South relations at the UNGA over the years. Afterwards, the 
track record of Brazilian–African relations is dully contextualised. Following some 
methodological notes, we present the respective data in order to answer the original 
queries, followed by some concluding remarks highlighting additional niches wor-
thy of further research.
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Translating South–South into the UNGA
The concept of South–South relations has often stood at the forefront of interna-
tional politics through the creation of multiple formal and informal coalitions. While 
sharing a common track record of underdevelopment and previous rule by colonial 
powers, several Asian, African and Latin American countries sought to devise new 
alternatives to the post-World War II institutional framework. The Bandung Confer-
ence of 1955, in particular, triggered a new wave of collective action as its most 
evident output, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), was founded in 1961 with the 
core aim of avoiding Third World-involvement in East–West rivalries. Classic realist 
accounts perceived this as part of a balancing move, in the face of the threat posed 
by the superpower’s military interventionism and economic domination at the time 
(e.g. Krasner 1985; cf. David 1991). But the NAM’s identity was, above all, strongly 
embedded in ‘the evolving notions of non-interference (sovereignty), equality and 
solidarity between (previously) marginalised/colonised states’ (Vieira 2016: 299). 
Likewise, the G77, founded in 1964 under the purview of the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), abided to the same logic and vied 
for a fairer and more equal international economic order by means of increased con-
certed action between developing countries.
Unsurprisingly, these dynamics were quickly translated into the UNGA, as the 
most representative international venue of the time. How to improve their capacity 
of joint negotiation in the UN system comprised a coveted goal for such groupings, 
as it provided a ‘cost-effective way to have a voice in world affairs’ as well as a way 
to avoid the ‘additional expenditure of official visits and resident diplomatic mis-
sions’ (Braveboy-Wagner 2009: 6). The fact that the regular workload of both the 
NAM and the G77 was also conducted within the UNGA framework further attested 
to their shared umbilical connection. In fact, during the Algiers Summit in 1973, 
the NAM formally established the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-aligned Move-
ment (CoB-NAM) to precisely harmonise UN activities, thus marking its beginning 
as a ‘voting bloc within the United Nations and international agencies, subject to 
growing pressure on its members to conform to non-aligned positions in their vot-
ing patterns’ (Jackson 1983: 28). Accordingly, common economic and development 
aims, the struggle for decolonisation, international outcry over Apartheid-led South 
Africa or the issue of Palestine often provided rallying points to foster common vot-
ing positions (Peterson 2006: 13–29; Morphet 1995).
A set of more specific studies on the topic, though, deserve additional reference. 
Iida (1988), for instance, provided one of the first attempts to grasp the South’s inner 
dynamics by analysing the then-existing solidarity within the G77.1 As the inter-
est of such countries in that platform varied, it was possible to conclude that ‘when 
Third World states feel that they are losing power, they step up their efforts to coor-
dinate their policy positions so that they will increase their bargaining power. When 
their power is growing, they have less need for presenting a unified front’ (Iida 
1 See also Stokman (1977).
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1988: 394). On the other hand, Kim and Russett (1996) argued that, after the Cold 
War, ‘East–West division no longer prevails in General Assembly deliberations; a 
North–South cleavage has superseded cold war alignments, giving rise to state pref-
erences defined along developmental lines’. In their view, the bipolarity of interna-
tional relations acted as a buffer that prevented such fault lines from fully emerging 
but once the context irremediably changed, underlying tensions emerged. Hence, 
subsequent voting alignment would be expected ‘to be shaped by state preferences 
along developmental lines’ while ‘views of self-determination and economic devel-
opment will reflect the continuing great differences between rich and poor nations’ 
(Kim and Russett 1996: 631, 651).
The 1990s, however, spelled significant challenges to such a rational as these coun-
tries began to experience different economic track records while also becoming further 
engrained in the mechanics of an increased globalised world. Previous platforms like 
UNCTAD lost their centrality as the North–South dividing lines diluted in the face of 
key developments like the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Moreo-
ver, even though both the NAM and the G77 still continued to prove resilient lightning 
rods (Vieira 2016), it is hard to deny that the weight of these organisations in the wider 
international context as well as their overall political centrality for Southern countries 
has become somewhat diluted over time, thus decreasing their usefulness as the sole 
representative caucuses of South–South relations (Toye 2014). This has been further 
accentuated by the  increased proliferation of other multilateral options and a more 
fluid set of widespread regional dynamics, which only reinforces the need to explore 
other tokens of alleged South–South solidarity in the current context.
Brazil, Africa and the Global South in‑between
The historical track record of Brazilian–African relations has not been without its 
share of obstacles. During the Cold War, Brazil’s foreign policy agenda towards 
the South, in general, and towards Africa, in particular, fluctuated repeatedly while 
remaining at the mercy of internal political developments. This was due to a struc-
tural contradiction in the country’s own positioning, in which Brazil presented itself 
as both ‘ahead of Third World countries and out of sync with those in the First 
World’ (Miyamoto 2000: 120; cf. Swain Jr. 1981). The strategy was twofold: on 
the one hand, the country sought to benefit from its association to then-developing 
nations in order to reap better advantages in international negotiations; on the other 
hand, it sought a measured proximity to the superpowers so as to stay close to the 
main centres of decision (Selcher 1978).
In reflection of these different kinetic forces, Brazil contented itself to an observer 
status with NAM, as a way to become privy to internal discussions but without fully 
committing to the political goals that other leading Southern countries advocated at 
the time.2 The G77, however, proved to be a different story, as such a group zeroed 
in on the New International Economic Order (NIEO) agenda that could eventually 
2 For more on Brazil’s hesitating stance towards NAM during the 1960s, see Hershberg (2007).
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generate direct implications for Brazil’s own national development goals. The coun-
try’s involvement and active participation in multiple UNCTAD meetings and sub-
sequent proceedings at the UNGA were therefore considerably more substantial. In 
other words, Brazilian leaders proved far more interested in the practical outcomes 
of the economic agenda pushed by the G77 than in the diffuse political discourse 
subjacent to the NAM’s summitry routine.
Amidst this balance of external priorities, African countries often found them-
selves caught in-between tenuous spurs of international interest. After a widespread 
wave of decolonisation, the bulk of the new nations still faced internal battles for 
power and/or the consolidation of protracted leaderships, which further weakened 
their external positioning. The power of numbers, i.e. the proliferation of multilat-
eral options between like-minded nations, proved a useful strategy to overcome such 
a situation, thus also partly justifying their enthusiasm for a South–South solidar-
ity agenda (Cornelissen 2009: 7–10). The end of the Cold War and the following 
decade, however, brought around a new cycle of international disengagement with 
Africa.
For its part, and despite continuing interest on African Lusophone countries 
due to a shared historical and linguistic background, Brazil proved no exception in 
the overall disconnect with the continent. Renewed overtures across the Atlantic 
only emerged after 2003. Considered an instrumental component of Brazilian for-
eign policy agenda during the Lula da Silva years (2003–2010)—and followed, to 
some extent, by his successor, Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016)—revamped relations 
with Africa were deemed a part of a larger international insertion agenda, in which 
South–South alliances would help reduce asymmetries with other developed coun-
tries. This strategy involved the promotion of new multilateral forums that strived to 
accommodate shifting patterns of power. The institutionalisation of the India, Bra-
zil and South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum or the African–South American Sum-
mits, for instance, received considerable focus, given its explicit claims to increase 
Global South representation (e.g. Silva et al. 2016). But the revitalisation of previ-
ously dormant formats, like the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlan-
tic (ZOPACAS), also followed a similar rationale (Abdenur et al. 2016).
A common thread to these initiatives was the requirement of active participation 
by African countries as a precondition for both operationalisation and execution of 
any intended agenda. Consequently, overlapping memberships grew exponentially, 
which in turn ‘weakened rather than bolstered Southern solidarity’ (Cornelissen 
2009: 24). But amidst the proliferation of multilateral options, Brazil still contin-
ued ‘to position itself as a North–South balancer by trumpeting its “southernness”’ 
(Burges 2013: 579) while courting key African votes for its own policy goals. That 
was particularly evident in the 2003 trade negotiations in Cancun, Mexico, that gave 
birth to the commercial G-20 or even in the election of Brazilian officials for the 
WTO and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). But it was also in dis-
play at the UN, where Brazil’s wider aspirations for a permanent seat at the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) became a clear priority, in tandem with Africa’s 
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own Ezulwini Consensus on the same topic.3 High-politics associations were eas-
ily made given that any attempt to achieve an overall UN reform required sufficient 
arithmetic support at the UNGA. Coalition building with countries from the South 
was thus perceived as a pre-emptive leverage for any kind of overall UN reform, 
particularly when considering how African countries have ‘historically been able to 
use this multilateral space to ‘reward’ their southern partners for supporting the con-
tinent’s decolonisation and development, and to build political capital for the future’ 
(Vickers 2013: 682).
With this endgame in mind, Brazilian officials used a series of tools to enlist fur-
ther support. On the one hand, Brazil sought to occupy a symbolical-ideational space 
in international discussions. That included making good use of its prerogative to for-
mally open UNGA sessions each year and attempt to set the agenda for the coming 
weeks of high-level intergovernmental contacts.4 Speeches by both Lula da Silva and 
Dilma Rousseff routinely called for greater political centrality of the UNGA as a priv-
ileged forum to give voice to marginalised views in the international system (Corrêa 
2013). Likewise, the rollout of sectorial initiatives that could further rally additional 
partners, like the anti-hunger and extreme poverty action presented by Lula da Silva 
in 2004, showcased the willingness to bring other policy issues to the centre stage. 
On the other hand, more regular linkages were pursuit in order to translate bilateral 
affinities into greater multilateral dividends. For instance, 25 mechanisms of political 
consultations were signed with African countries between 2003 and 2013.5 Each and 
every of these instruments explicitly mentioned the increase of interactions in the UN 
context as an area susceptible for more contacts and joint activities. Ultimately, this 
self-reinforcing dynamic built upon a shared perception of the UNGA as a privileged 
platform for regimenting allied voices in support of common goals to reform interna-
tional governance structures, including the UN itself.
Hypotheses and methodology
The previous section elaborated on how Brazilian–African relations intensified in 
recent years. In this context, we are particularly interested with whether a pattern of 
vote convergence also emerged at the UNGA. If a growing intersection of agendas 
and interests took place, we would expect higher levels of voting cohesion between 
3 Between 1991 and 2013, Brazil held four mandates as a non-permanent member of the UNSC (1993–
1994; 1998–1999; 2004–2005; 2010–2011).
4 This prerogative is based on a long-standing diplomatic tradition, itself believed to have been origi-
nated during Brazilian Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha’s tenure as head of the I special UNGA session 
in 1947.
5 The mechanisms for political consultations were signed with such countries as Angola (2007), Benin 
(2007), Cameroon (2010), Cape Verde (2008), Congo (2005), Democratic Republic of Congo (2010), 
Egypt (2003), Ethiopia (2012), Ghana (2005), Guinea (2011), Guinea-Bissau (2007), Kenya (2005), 
Liberia (2010), Libya (2009), Mali (2009), Namibia (2008), Niger (2013), Nigeria (2000), Senegal 
(2002), Sierra Leone (2009), Sudan (2006), Togo (2009), Tunisia (2001), Zambia (2010) and Zimbabwe 
(2010). Every agreement is available at https ://conco rdia.itama raty.gov.br/.
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Brazil and Africa to take place at the UNGA from a longitudinal perspective. This 
is to be assumed given the overt efforts led by Brazilian officials to reconnect with 
Africa while casting such relations under a revamped South–South political mantle. 
Likewise, African political elites began to be more outspoken on Brazil’s support: 
‘we would approach them, and they would respond. (…) So that makes it very much 
easy, whether it is at home, whether it is at the UN and any other organisation’.6 We 
therefore anticipate (H1) voting cohesion at the UNGA between Brazil and African 
countries to have significantly increased between 1991 and 2013, and particularly 
from 2003 onwards. However, in order to not excessively lose country/regional-level 
variance by taking Africa as a single unit of analysis, we add a further robustness 
layer to our results by estimating voting cohesion between Brazil and two additional 
sub-samples. The first comprises 23 countries with whom Brazil signed politi-
cal consultations agreements during the indicated timeframe. The second consists 
of a narrower set including only Lusophone African countries, with whom Brazil 
has maintained more intense bilateral relations over time.7 By considering these two 
samples, we do not take for granted that voting cohesion occurred homogenously; 
on the contrary, our expectation is to find higher scores within key clusters. In other 
words, given the formal mechanisms put into place with the former as well as the 
existing historical, cultural and linguistic connections with the latter, we expect to 
find (H1a) higher levels of voting cohesion between Brazil and 23 selected coun-
tries, and even more between Brazil and Lusophone Africa, than with the overall 
continent.
Still, and as Voeten cautions, this kind of results ‘between countries could rise 
or fall simply because the agenda changes, without any change in state interests. 
Ignoring this issue in time series applications could lead to biased inferences 
as these changes in the agenda could be endogenous to outcomes’ (2013: 56; see 
also Kim and Russett 1996). Hence, the content/issue dimension of every resolu-
tion needs to be taken into account. Following a previously designed classification 
(Amorim Neto 2012; see also ‘Appendix 1’), we thus aim to uncover whether the 
South–South rhetoric of renovated Brazilian–African relations followed an overall 
pattern or evidenced thematic preferences instead. Previous studies of UNGA vot-
ing data have demonstrated how Southern countries were fairly united in economic 
issue areas during the Cold War, but ‘miserably divided’ on such issues as secu-
rity and human rights (Iida 1988: 383). After 1991, tentative evidence pointed to 
the emergence of larger majorities on self-determination and disarmament issues 
(Kim and Russett 1996: 641). We therefore seek to verify whether those trends hold 
and argue that (H2) voting cohesion at the UNGA between Brazil and African coun-
tries between 1991 and 2013 shifted from a prominence of socio-economic issues 
to a more explicit emphasis on a political-security agenda. Yet again, we expect 
7 The first subset includes every African country mentioned on endnote 5, with the exceptions of Ethio-
pia and Niger. Given that the political consultations agreements with the two countries were signed too 
close to the timeframe limit (2013), they were not considered to have feasibly produced any effects on the 
overall voting patterns. The second subset includes Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, 
and São Tomé and Príncipe.
6 Interview with Namibian official, Windhoek, 06/05/2014.
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some variation in results when different clusters of countries are considered. With 
regard to Lusophone Africa, however, reduction and/or conclusion of civil conflicts 
together with more pressing needs for reconstruction and economic growth would 
lead us to anticipate (H2a) an inverted shift in reflection of such internal changes, i.e. 
voting cohesion between Brazil and Lusophone Africa witnessed an adjustment of 
emphasis from political-security to economic issues.
We draw our analysis from Strezhnev and Voeten’s data set (2013), which con-
tains data on every roll-call vote taken at the UNGA between 1946 and 2013, 
including the individual voting choices of each state member on each resolution. 
From such vast source material, we extracted a total of 1637 resolutions put to a 
roll-call vote during the forty-six through the sixty-eightieth sessions (1991 through 
2013), involving 55 countries from Africa (54) and Latin America (1). As a meas-
urement formula, we recurred to the Agreement Index (AI), as originally applied by 
Hix et al. (2005). Perfect cohesion is represented by AI = 1, whereas AI = 0 repre-
sents no cohesion.8
Fig. 1  Agreement Index between Brazil and Africa (1991–2013). Source: United Nations General 
Assembly Voting Data. Authors’ calculations
8 The AI treats ‘yes’, ‘no’ and ‘abstain’ on equal footing, thus creating a separate count of each vote 
choice for each resolution, represented by Y, N and A, respectively. AI is given by the following equation:
Perfect cohesion is represented by AI = 1, whereas AI = 0 represents no cohesion. If there are equal num-
bers of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ votes, but no ‘abstain’ votes, then AI > 0, since countries proved cohesive enough 
in agreeing not to abstain (Hix et al. 2005: 215). However, we also acknowledge a considerable debate 
within UNGA literature over different cohesion measures, particular with regard to the issue of absten-
tions. In that sense, we further tested two alternatives, namely CI and CII, following Hosli et al.’s own 
designation (2010: 17, 18). Regardless, we found no significant variation between results using CI and 
CII and the results obtained while using AI.
AI = MAX{Y ,N,A} − 0.5[(Y + N + A) −MAX{Y ,N,A}]∕Y + N + A
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Brazil–Africa cohesion at the UNGA
This section analyses the voting patterns between Brazil and Africa during the 
1991–2013 period at the UNGA. The graphical insights shown in Fig.  1 dem-
onstrate that our first hypothesis (H1) can only be partially confirmed. Indeed, 
the data systematically depict high AI levels (ranging from 0.87 to 0.98) between 
Brazil and African countries in the period analysed. However, contrary to our ini-
tial expectations, cohesion does not increase steadily over time nor does it esca-
late significantly in the last decade with regard to the two largest samples (‘Brazil 
and 56 African countries’ and ‘Brazil and 23 African countries’). In fact, three 
main trends can be instead extracted: (1) downwards in the early 1990s, with AI 
falling from 0.96 to 0.89, the lowest value observed in the period; (2) upwards 
between 1994 and 2002, when AI peaks to 0.94; and (3) overall steadiness from 
2003 onwards.
These results can partly result from contextual factors. For instance, lower 
AI in the first period can be justifiable by the fact this was a period of consid-
erable changes in the African continent. Indeed, during the early 1990s, nearly 
every state in Sub-Saharan Africa embarked in liberalisation reforms aiming at 
the realisation of multiparty elections. This period was hallmarked by changes in 
power (between incumbent and newcomers) and shifting alliances in a post-Cold 
War global order. It is therefore reasonable to expect a corresponding effect on 
international engagements. Two other central observations can also be drawn. For 
one, even though general high levels of cohesion can be observed throughout the 
last decade, the time span of such pattern differs from what had been originally 
anticipated. While 1991 proved the apex of overall cohesion, a considerable surge 
is already visible in 1994/1995 rather than an unequivocal increase from 2003 
onwards. More strikingly, the peak of cohesion afterwards can be found in 2002 
with a score of 0.94. This result goes somewhat against the narrative that political 
reengagement between both sides only started later on. Or, to put it differently, 
it provides tentative evidence that voting positions at the UNGA were already 
considerably more in tune than what had been publically perceived or conveyed 
at the time.
But perhaps even more relevant, it is also visible that cohesion levels with 
African Lusophone countries fall in line with our initial expectations  (H1a) and 
were indeed noticeably higher. In fact, 2009 witnessed a score of 0.98, the highest 
of the three series under analysis. These results point to an understated relational 
dimension that displays considerably more intensity than wider representation 
samples, thus providing some credence to a ‘cultural rationalisation’ that in turn 
also fuels greater international approximation in multilateral fora.
In order to assess our second hypothesis, we first present a descriptive analysis 
on the number of resolutions voted per year and per category. As Table 1 shows, 
there is considerable variation in the primacy given to each category: ‘Politics 
and Security’ is by far the most relevant category making up for nearly half of 
the total resolutions (N = 779; 46.6%). This is followed by ‘Social, Technical and 
Cultural’ (N = 387; 23.1%) and ‘Colonial/Protectorate’ (N = 253; 15.1%), whereas 
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‘Economy’ (N = 98; 5.9%), ‘Legal’ (N = 83; 5.0%) and ‘UN Administration and 
Finance’ (N = 37; 2.2%) account for considerably less resolutions. Longitudinally 
there are not clear trends and the average number of resolutions per year is 72, 
with the lowest number found in 1998 (62) and the highest in 2006 (87). It is 
also noteworthy the inexistence of resolutions in 1991 and 2008 concerning ‘UN 
Administration and Finance’, hence the exclusion of such years from the graphic 
representation.
For a finer analysis, Figs. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 present the longitudinal evolution of 
each of the categories considered. It becomes clear how despite generally high cohe-
sion values, there are striking differences across the various categories. Figures  3 
and 4, for instance, put into display how cohesion was overall higher with regard 















N % N % N % N % N % N % N %
1991 40 5.1 6 6.1 16 4.1 8 3.2 0 0.0 4 4.8 74 4.5
1992 42 5.4 4 4.1 16 4.1 8 3.2 2 5.4 3 3.6 75 4.6
1993 34 4.4 4 4.1 13 3.4 9 3.6 1 2.7 4 4.8 65 4.0
1994 36 4.6 3 3.1 13 3.4 10 4.0 1 2.7 5 6.0 68 4.2
1995 35 4.5 3 3.1 17 4.4 22 8.7 1 2.7 3 3.6 81 4.9
1996 39 5.0 4 4.1 14 3.6 10 4.0 3 8.1 4 4.8 74 4.5
1997 32 4.1 6 6.1 18 4.7 8 3.2 1 2.7 5 6.0 70 4.3
1998 34 4.4 4 4.1 11 2.8 8 3.2 2 5.4 3 3.6 62 3.8
1999 35 4.5 4 4.1 16 4.1 10 4.0 1 2.7 2 2.4 68 4.2
2000 32 4.1 4 4.1 16 4.1 10 4.0 3 8.1 3 3.6 68 4.2
2001 32 4.1 4 4.1 15 3.9 10 4.0 3 8.1 2 2.4 66 4.0
2002 36 4.6 4 4.1 16 4.1 10 4.0 1 2.7 7 8.4 74 4.5
2003 30 3.9 6 6.1 22 5.7 14 5.5 1 2.7 3 3.6 76 4.6
2004 30 3.9 4 4.1 18 4.7 12 4.7 3 8.1 5 6.0 72 4.4
2005 31 4.0 4 4.1 22 5.7 11 4.3 1 2.7 5 6.0 74 4.5
2006 40 5.1 3 3.1 23 5.9 15 5.9 3 8.1 3 3.6 87 5.3
2007 33 4.2 5 5.1 23 5.9 11 4.3 2 5.4 3 3.6 77 4.7
2008 33 4.2 4 4.1 20 5.2 12 4.7 0 0.0 4 4.8 73 4.5
2009 31 4.0 6 6.1 18 4.7 11 4.3 1 2.7 2 2.4 69 4.2
2010 32 4.1 3 3.1 14 3.6 11 4.3 3 8.1 4 4.8 67 4.1
2011 31 4.0 4 4.1 16 4.1 10 4.0 2 5.4 2 2.4 65 4.0
2012 31 4.0 5 5.1 15 3.9 12 4.7 1 2.7 4 4.8 68 4.2
2013 30 3.9 4 4.1 15 3.9 11 4.3 1 2.7 3 3.6 64 3.9
Total 779 46.6 98 5.9 387 23.1 253 15.1 37 2.2 83 5.0 1637 97.8
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to resolutions addressing ‘Economy’ and ‘Colonial/Protectorate’ issues, while the 
remaining categories indicate slightly lower results, at some point in time or the 
other, particularly in terms of ‘Social, Technical, and Cultural’ issues.
In spite of no uniform temporal trend across all categories, some results do stand 
out. A few only emerge due to the low number of thematic resolutions assigned in a 
respective year. For instance, only two resolutions were put to a vote with regard to 
‘UN Administration and Finance’ issues in 2011. But given that one comprised the 
highly contested resolution 66/1A—concerning credentials for Libyan representa-
tives at the UNGA after the overthrown of Muammar al-Gaddafi—the registered 
Fig. 2  Agreement Index between Brazil and Africa on ‘Politics and Security’ issues (1991–2013). 
Source: United Nations General Assembly Voting Data. Authors’ calculations
Fig. 3  Agreement Index between Brazil and Africa on ‘Economy’ issues (1991–2013). Source: United 
Nations General Assembly Voting Data. Authors’ calculations
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19 votes in favour (Brazil included), 12 votes against and 5 abstentions were suf-
ficient to promote an abrupt decline in AI levels. The same applies to the ‘Legal’ 
category in 2004, when Brazil (together with Gabon) voted against the UN Dec-
laration on Human Cloning in resolution 59/280, as opposed to 10 abstentions and 
20 votes in favour by African countries. Likewise, regarding ‘Economy’ issues, the 
slightly lower levels of agreement observed in 2007 and in 2011 are mainly driven 
by abstentions in resolutions concerning the use and dissemination of appropriate 
sustainable agricultural technologies (resolutions 62/190 and 66/195, respectively).
Fig. 4  Agreement Index between Brazil and Africa on ‘Social, Technical, and Cultural’ issues (1991–
2013). Source: United Nations General Assembly Voting Data. Authors’ calculations
Fig. 5  Agreement Index between Brazil and Africa on ‘Colonial/Protectorate’ issues (1991–2013). 
Source: United Nations General Assembly Voting Data. Authors’ calculations
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Other results, however, prove more significant due to the size of the sample in 
question. ‘Social, Technical and Cultural’ issues, for example, comprise the second 
largest category of resolutions, and its inner contention is visible in 1996, when res-
olution 51/109 on the situation of human rights in Nigeria led to 6 votes in favour 
(Brazil included), 28 abstentions and 12 votes against. An identical clash within the 
same issue dimension was recorded in 2008 with regard to resolution 63/168 over a 
moratorium on death penalty, which enlisted 21 votes in favour (Brazil included), 19 
abstentions and 9 votes against. Possible grounds for these variations can be found in 
Fig. 6  Agreement Index between Brazil and Africa on ‘UN Administration and Finance’ issues (1991–
2013). Source: United Nations General Assembly Voting Data. Authors’ calculations
Fig. 7  Agreement Index between Brazil and Africa on ‘Legal’ issues (1991–2013). Source: United 
Nations General Assembly Voting Data. Authors’ calculations
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the imbalances long identified within South–South relations, themselves translatable 
into a wide ‘range of perspectives that reflect, among others factors, local contingen-
cies of ethnicity and faith, differing socio-economic status and resource endowment’ 
(Alden et al. 2010: 223). Or, to put it differently, matters that are put up to a vote and 
clash with internal affairs, customs and/or traditions, may, in turn, trump possible 
common South–South stances, whether within the African group itself, or within 
African countries/clusters and other partners.
Still, based on these findings, our initial expectations are only partially con-
firmed. While cohesion around ‘Politics and Security’ issues remained overall high, 
cohesion around ‘Economy’ issues continued to hit comparably higher scores, even 
despite the flotation in recent years. The ‘Social, Technical, and Cultural’ category, 
on the other hand, displayed some variation during the period in which South–South 
relations were supposedly re-brought to the forefront of the international stages. 
Moreover, the additional sub-samples of African countries proved virtually indistin-
guishable from the broader continental representation in terms of thematic empha-
ses. Hence, it is neither possible to unequivocally state that the overall pattern fol-
lowed a transition from economic and development issues to an overt emphasis 
on post-Cold War high-politics issues nor that the reverse occurred with regard to 
Lusophone Africa alone. One consisting finding, however, is that cohesion remained 
yet again generally higher between the latter and Brazil.
Conclusion
Systemic changes often produce a sizeable impact in international multilateral ven-
ues, be that in terms of membership, capabilities or geographic reach. Still, the 
perception that the UNGA absorbed post-Cold War dynamics and began reflect-
ing newer Southern alignments is not without its critics. Voeten, for instance, once 
argued that voting at the UNGA in the 1990s was largely one-dimensional, reflect-
ing instead changes in regime type and wealth among the different nations and more 
closely mirroring the East–West duality during the Cold War rather than a strict 
North–South one (2000; cf. Malone and Hagman 2002). That said, the UNGA man-
aged to remain at the forefront of South–South debates and is intrinsically connected 
to its own historical evolution. It therefore remains a useful domain to take the pulse 
of eventual South–South stimuli.
This article provides three original contributions to the field. Firstly, it adds to 
studies on the UNGA by exposing how instances of contemporary South–South 
relations unfold within the current dynamics of such body. By unpacking the content 
of resolutions, it goes beyond the established notion that such legal instruments only 
propitiate ‘engines of groupthink, given to lowest common denominator outcomes’ 
and calls for greater attention to the work carried out within this specific fold (Hein-
becker 2004: 278). Secondly, it presents a novel take on the contemporary role of 
South–South relations, thus helping to ‘put the idea of the Global South back on 
the political and intellectual map’ (Hurrell 2013: 217). And thirdly, it fills a niche 
over the engagement of rising powers with multilateral forums, and particularly the 
UNGA, amidst their wider external outreach strategies.
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Overall, three key conclusions can be withdrawn. Firstly, Brazilian–African rela-
tions have indeed been met with a considerable level of cohesion at the UNGA, in 
tandem with a rising public profile in the world stages. However, closer observa-
tion also allows us to infer that such an evolution can be in fact traced far back than 
what it would be expected, thus leading us to question the degree of political capi-
talisation over such a subject in recent years by each side’s respective leaderships. 
We therefore subscribe to the notion that Brazil–Africa relations at the UNGA—as 
representative tokens of wider South–South relations—exhibited a sizeable cohesive 
substance at its core, but one in which both its origin and evolution are less context-
driven than what has been publically perceived until this point. Secondly, assuming 
informal large political groupings as Brazil and Africa as a single cohesive entity 
carries the risk of overlooking more specific, and sometimes even more intensive, 
sub-dynamics of their own. The narrower case of voting positions between Brazil 
and Lusophone Africa serves as a cautionary tale in that regard. And thirdly, proven 
general cohesion also does not necessarily equate to a monolithic voting pattern. 
Rather, thematic differences can be found amidst UNGA records that underscore 
multiple positions, themselves a likely product of the heterogeneity inherent to the 
set of countries in question. Likewise, the overall voting pattern has yet to follow 
expectations that the end of the Cold War would result in significant changes in 
content within UN proceedings. This may lead us to ultimately question whether 
the ‘artificial division of the world into a global North and global South’ remains a 
simplification, and ‘like all simplifications, it overlooks substantial parts of reality’ 
(Weiss 2009: 282).
These conclusions in no way exhaust the topic at bay as we also recognise three 
other interrelated threads that require further exploring. Firstly, how changes in lead-
ership on both sides impact such results. Recent findings have shown that foreign 
policy patterns at the UNGA emanating from democratic countries remain fairly 
consistent and stable over time (Mattes, Leeds and Carroll 2015). On the inverted 
spectrum, leader turnover in autocratic countries is likelier to lead to more acute 
shifts in such a venue (Smith 2016). In that sense, Brazil and Africa could both 
warrant a more in-depth verification of such assumptions. Secondly, we recognise 
the importance of incorporating voting cohesion into more complex measurement 
instruments (Drieskens et  al. 2014). More attention should be paid to the actual 
country-sponsors or co-sponsors of the resolutions under analysis in order to effec-
tively break down and measure followership of key nations. And thirdly, it would be 
worthy to try and replicate these results with regard to other rising powers that have 
equally made use of the South–South narrative in recent years. The cases of India 
and China towards Africa, in particular, could hold considerable comparative ramifi-
cations for the debate over their own emergence in the world at large.
Ultimately, we did not seek to cast this set of countries as solely Southern in 
their dealings, nor do their external engagements are exhausted by just such a spe-
cific trait. But given how ‘Brazil’s self-identity [has] sat at the intersection between 
the West and “the rest”’ (Spektor 2016: 33; Burges 2013), and how African coun-
tries only seem to ‘“make numbers count” where national interests genuinely align 
behind a common position’ (Brown 2012: 1904), we are required to verify the prac-
tical application of hefty declaratory statements. Brazilian–African voting cohesion 
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has been historically high, and it will most likely not abate any time soon. This fits 
the trend of overall South–South cohesion, which has also been significant on its 
own throughout history. That does not mean, however, it has been met with any par-
ticular boost or increase in recent years, as rhetoric would lead us to believe. Dis-
course is not necessarily empty of content, but it often needs to be translated into 
practical outcomes. Hence, we would argue there is more than meets the eye in this 
kind of relations and particularly so, in terms of UNGA voting records. Even though 
such data cannot and should not be taken at face value, it can still prove a useful 
barometer of South–South cohesion.
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